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(5)
Statutes concerning negligent offenses against the public
safety, found in thirty-three states;
(6)
Statutes on negligent offenses against public justice, found
in fifteen states.
The following statutory provisions relative to criminal negligence
are recommended as desirable for general adoption:
(1)
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union
or joint operation of act and intent, criminal negligence, or reckless
8
and wanton misconduct.Y
(2)
Reckless and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of
an act, or failure to do an act which it is his duty to do, by one who
knows or has reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize that his conduct involves a high degree of probability
that substantial harm will result therefrom5'T
(3)
Criminal negligence is the want of the care which would be
exercised by a man of ordinary prudence under the same or similar
circumstances.
(4)
Except in cases where it is otherwise provided by law, the
court in passing sentence upon one who has been convicted of a crime
or public offense shall take into consideration whether the criminal
act was committed intentionally, or through reckless and wanton
misconduct, or through ordinary criminal negligence, and shall adjust
the sentence accordingly.
JOSEPH S. FREELAND.

WILLS-REVOCATION BY DESTRUCTION.
Mary Nish left her will in the possession of W. S. McCaull, her
relative and attorney. Desiring to revoke a codicil of the will, she
wrote McCaull and told him to destroy the codicil, which he did by
tearing it into some thirty pieces, which he later reassembled and
pasted to a piece of paper, thus restoring the codicil to its original
legibility. The testatrix was advised of the destruction before her
death. In an action to probate the will and codicil as if there had
been no destruction, it was held that the codicil had been destroyed
by the tearing by McCaull. Thus, the Iowa court fairly and squarely
held that a testator might, by a written letter, not executed with the
formalities of a will, denote a third person his agent for the purpose
of destroying his will, and that the destructive act need not be committed in the presence of the testator, and yet that the statutory requirements for revocation would be satisfied.
2160 . Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) § 4486, cited supra in note 11.
217C. the Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934) § 500.
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STUDENT NOTES
I
The Iowa statute concerning revocation of wills
is unique in that
It does not specifically require the act of destruction to be committed
in the presence of the testator, when done by any person other than
himself. The vast majority of such statutes in the United States are
patterned after the English Statute of Frauds,2 and the Statute of
Victoria, 4 both of which stated that the destruction of the will must
take place in the presence of the testator. Kentucky's statutory requirements for revocation are considered representative.
However,
Florida' and Georgia' both have statutes worded somewhat similarly
to the Iowa statute, both being silent as to whether or not the destruction must be in the presence of the testator." Several states have no
statutory provision providing for revocation by destruction8
There were two possible means of revocation available to the
testatrix: Cancellation or destruction. Under the Iowa statute there
were specific requirements set forth for revocation by cancellation, to
the effect that such revocation must fulfill the same formalities as a
will, but there were no specific statutory requirements concerning revocation by destruction. 0
The Iowa court evidently bent over backward in an effort to give effect to the apparent intent of the testatrix,
and overlooked the fact that the letter instructing the attorney to destroy the letter was testamentary in character, since it had the effect
to Increase the shares of the remaining legatees. While the testatrix
probably intended to revoke her will by the manual act of destruction,
and in fact there was an actual destruction of the will, still, her letter
could at most be treated only as a new instrument, testamentary in
contents, but falling far short of the well-established rule that a cancellation must be executed with the same formalities as a will." As

2 Iowa Code (1931) Sec. 11855. "Wills can only be revoked in
whole or in part by being cancelled or destroyed by the act or direction
of the testator, with the intention of so revoking them, or by the execution of subsequent wills. When done by cancellation, the revocation must be witnessed in the same manner as the making of a new
will."
'29 Car. II (1677) Sec. 6.
'7 Win. & 1 Vic. (1838) c. 26, Sec. 20.
Kentucky Statutes (1930) Sec. 4833. "No will or codicil, or any
part thereof, shall be revoked, unless . . . by some writing declaring
an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which
a will is required to be executed, or by the testator, or some person in
his presence, and by his direction, cutting, tearing, burning, obliterating, cancelling or destroying the same, or the signature thereto, with
the intent to revoke."
"Rev. Gen. Statutes of Florida (1920) Sec. 3596. (Applies to
realty only. No provision concerning personalty.)
Parks Ann. Code (1914) Sec. 3919.
"Tennessee and Louisiana, for example. For a discussion of the
statutory requirements of the various states for revocation of wills,
see Borden, The Statute Law of Wills (1929) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 283.
'Rood on Wills (2d ed.) Sec. 320.
"'Iowa Code (1931) Sec. 11855, set out in full in n. 2, supra.
Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument
(1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 469, at 472-473.
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such a situation had never arisen in any of the other states having
statutes similar to the one in Iowa," the Iowa court was unable to
base its opinion on anything but its own ideas on the subject, which,
it is submitted, are wrong, and lead to several undesirable results.
First, it is submitted that the Iowa court erred in the construction
given the statute. Admittedly, the statute does not in so many words
require that the destructive act be in the presence of the testator when
done by another person at his direction. Such a construction as is
given the statute by the Iowa court, however, leaves the field of fraud
wide open in every case where the will is left in the hands of a third
person; if the letter directing the destruction is to be held merely
evidentiary-and that is the effect of the holding of the Iowa courtthen other and weaker evidence will also suffice to establish the
agency, and show the intent of the testator that the will or parts thereof should be destroyed. While it is not in the province of the courts
to legislate, and in effect add the words "in the presence of the testator" to the statute, still it is argued that the court should have adopted
as its common law, because of policy, that the destruction should take
place in the presence of the testator, or that the designation of the
agency for the specific purposes of destroying the will should comply
with the statutory requirements for the execution of a will.
Second, it was unnecessary that the court even consider the part
of the statute pertaining to destruction of wills. The statute specifically provides that when a will is revoked by cancellation, such an Instrument must be executed with the same formalities as a will." Obviously the testatrix could not have written to her attorney and directed him to prepare, sign, and witness a will for her. Thus, it necessarily follows that she could not simply write to him and direct
that the will be destroyed. Such a letter could be treated only as a
subsequent testamentary instrument, and, unless it is witnessed in the
same manner required of wills, it should have no effect on the will
whatsoever. The holding of the Iowa court is plainly against the
policy enunciated in the Iowa case of Gay v. Gay, 4 which holds that
revocation by subsequent instrument can be effective only when the
instrument is executed with all the formalities of a will.
Third, the holding of the Iowa court was not in conformity with
the apparent tendencies of the laws of wills. It has been held that a
2Of. Harris v. McDonald, 152 Ga. 18, 108 S. E. 448 (1921). The
Georgia court, in construing a somewhat similar statutory provision,
where there was a failure to comply with the request to destroy the
will, said, "Under this section it is necessary that the will be actually
destroyed or obliterated. Mere direction to destroy not followed by
actual destruction, will not effect a revocation . . ." This presupposes
that had the will actually been destroyed, then, even though the destruction was not in the presence of the testator, the statute would
have been complied with.
"Iowa Code (1931) Sec. 11855, set out in full in n. 2, slupra.
14 60 Iowa 415, 14 N. W. 238 (1882).
See also Dean v. Beall, 2 Ky.
Op. 288 (1868).
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will was not executed within the contemplation of the Wills Act when
the testator could not have seen the subscribing witnesses while they
were attaching their signatures in an adjoining room,25 or when the
testatrix could not, because of her condition, and some intervening
curtains, have turned and observed the attestation of her will, though
6
Is it not quite as imIt was completed in the same room with her.
portant that, in order to prevent fraud, the destruction of a will should
be executed with the same care and precaution? It is apparent that
the law regards with suspicion and jealousy any act having effect on
the will of a testator, when such an act does not take place either
within his plain view, or where he might easily have seen the act.
This is easily evidenced by the large number of states that require
the act to be in the presence of the testator.
It is submitted that the court was in error in holding that the
destruction need not be in the presence of the testatrix, and, as this
was the sole point decided, the case must be wrong.
SAmuEL C. KENNEDY.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-LEX LOCI OR LEX FORI TO GOVERN
DAMAGES.
"The measure of damages for a tort is governed by the law of
the place where the tort was committed", says Professor Beale in his
2
work on Conflict of Laws.' Beale, supported by the majority of cases,
holds that where the right of action was created, there also the measure of damages was settled. In short, Beale and, seemingly, the
majority of courts think that the measure of damages is part of the
right and not the remedy; that it is part of substantive and not of
procedural law; for if the measure of damages were a matter of procedure, then lex forl would apply instead of 7ex 7oci.
Upon an analysis of the theories upon which the differentiation
between substantive and procedural law is based, it would seem to be
more logical to say that the measure of damages is a part of the
remedial side of the question-totally disconnected from the right. It
Is almost a waste of time to point out that in many cases there exists
a well-defined and recognized cause of action, which because of exemption statutes or the Bankruptcy Act, the plaintiff is unable to carry into
execution profitably to himself. Here we have a valid cause of action
which, if prosecuted, will result in a judgment for the plaintiff; but
"Goods of Colman, 3 Curt. Eccl. 118 (1842); Norton v. Bazett,
D. & W. 259 (1856).
,'Tribe v. Tribe, 1 Rob. Eccl. 775 (1845).
12 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) See. 412.2.
2American R. E. Co. v. Davis, 152 Ark. 258, 238 S. W. 50 (1922);
Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 Atl. 794 (1925);
Roseberry v. Scott, 120 Kan. 576, 244 Pac. 1063 (1926); L. N. R. R. v.
Whitlow, 114 Ky. 470, 43 S. W. 711 (1S97).

